U.S. Denies to Put a Kill Switch in Its F-35 Fighter Jets to Avoid Losing a Fortune. There’s a Bigger Issue at Play: Controlling the ‘Blue Line’

The main problem with the F-35 isn’t merely the absence of a button to disable it. Rather, it lies in the structural design that creates an unavoidable dependency on Washington.

F-35 fighter jet
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miguel-jorge

Miguel Jorge

Writer
  • Adapted by:

  • Alba Mora

miguel-jorge

Miguel Jorge

Writer

Journalist. I've spent more than half of my life writing about technology, science, and culture. Before landing here, I worked at Telefónica, Prisa, Globus Comunicación, Hipertextual, and Gizmodo. I'm part of Webedia's cross-section team.

176 publications by Miguel Jorge
alba-mora

Alba Mora

Writer

An established tech journalist, I entered the world of consumer tech by chance in 2018. In my writing and translating career, I've also covered a diverse range of topics, including entertainment, travel, science, and the economy.

310 publications by Alba Mora

A rumor recently started circulating suggesting that the U.S. holds a kind of “kill switch” for the artillery it sells worldwide. The story gained considerable traction, prompting Washington to intervene. Concerned about potential financial losses, especially as Europe discusses rearmament, the U.S. denied that this kind of button exists on its F-35s. However, the reality is that it does have similar capabilities, albeit in a different form.

The U.S. is left out. To understand the significance of this kill switch rhetoric, it’s important to consider the geopolitical landscape. The European Union has launched the ambitious European Defense Readiness 2030 plan. The EU aims at strengthening its defense autonomy through increased military spending and a substantial expansion of its industrial capacity for local arms production.

The initiative arises amid growing distrust toward the U.S., spurred by a strategic distancing from Europe and volatility in arms supplies. Decisions made by President Donald Trump have also alarmed U.S. allies. Europe’s shift toward arms protectionism could likely result in the U.S. missing out on billions of dollars in arms sales contracts. The new framework prioritizes EU member countries and select close partners. As such, it explicitly excludes the U.S. and the United Kingdom.

Ukraine: a catalyst. The EU’s recent move has been influenced by the sudden halt of arms and intelligence support to Ukraine during Trump’s administration. This has raised concerns about the reliability of U.S. involvement.

Moreover, recent reports have alarmed observers by suggesting that the U.S. may possess the capability to remotely disable advanced weaponry such as the F-35. This fear is exacerbated by the operational dependence of these systems on logistical, maintenance, and software networks controlled by U.S. contractors.

The truth about the F-35. Both the Pentagon and Lockheed Martin have categorically denied the existence of a “kill switch” that would allow the U.S. to remotely disable the F-35. However, the operational reality of the system is functionally equivalent to this kind of capability.

The F-35 global supply chain The F-35 global supply chain in 2018 has undergone significant changes, particularly with Turkish companies no longer involved in the program.

How? The logistical structure, maintenance requirements, and reliance on proprietary software mean that no country can fully operate the F-35 without constant support from the U.S.

This concern started as a rumor in defense circles but has escalated to the point where the F-35 Joint Program Office and Lockheed Martin have had to issue official statements to alleviate international worries. They claim that all operators possess the necessary capabilities due to “well-established agreements.” However, these statements inadvertently highlight a key issue. The aircraft isn’t autonomous for its buyers. It can only operate as directed by the U.S.

A closed and controlled ecosystem. The F-35 isn’t merely a fighter jet but a sophisticated software platform reliant on a global support network managed by the U.S. Its operation depends on systems such as the Autonomic Logistics Information System and its successor, the Operational Data Integrated Network (ODIN). These systems not only manage maintenance and logistics but also handle crucial information, like Mission Data Files (MDF).

This dependency is a serious concern. These files define several critical parameters, including threat assessments, detection flight paths, sensor fusion, and electronic warfare capabilities. To illustrate the seriousness of this situation, if a country loses access to the ODIN or stops receiving updates to its MDFs, the F-35 becomes nearly useless or significantly limited in its operational abilities.

This arrangement places any buyer in a position akin to being a technological hostage of the U.S., rendering them unable to maintain full control over their fleet. A clear example of this is illustrated by the concept of the “blue line.”

F-35 fighter jets

The blue line. The mentioned mission planning “data package” is crucial for the survival of the F-35. It fundamentally determines control over the so-called blue line, which is the aircraft’s route into enemy territory. The blue line is calculated based on several factors, including enemy air defense zones and the aircraft’s stealth and electronic warfare capabilities. It’s also calculated based on onboard sensors and weaponry, and the integrated tactics used by the F-35 alongside other military assets.

The blue line represents one of the F-35’s most powerful advantages–possibly even its most significant asset. In other words, without complete control of the blue line, the fighter and its pilot have limited options once they enter enemy airspace. This makes them susceptible to detection and potential shootdown.

A system designed for independence. The design logic behind the F-35 is similar to that of tech products such as the iPhone or Tesla. They’re complex, closed systems that centralize repairs and upgrades. This means that whenever a critical component is damaged or needs an upgrade, U.S. contractors or personnel trained to U.S. standards must be called in.

Additionally, the supply chain for the F-35 relies on more than 1,400 suppliers in the U.S. and just 80 in 11 other countries. This underscores the dominance of U.S. industry in the product, even in its exported versions.

Billions at stake. The fighter map above illustrates the importance of “trust” among buyers. Essentially, this represents a significant fortune for Washington in a global geopolitical landscape that’s both unstable and unpredictable. Moreover, Trump’s return to office, his anti-globalization rhetoric, and his questioning of alliances like NATO have heightened distrust. Governments are starting to reconsider how secure their investment is in a system they can’t fully control. This is particularly true in a scenario where diplomatic tensions with the U.S. could cause it to cease functioning effectively.

Financial markets are already beginning to reflect this strategic shift. Stocks of European arms manufacturers have been rising for months, driven by expectations of increased local production of military equipment. However, it’ll take time for this new European plan to translate into tangible weapons systems.

Until then, the U.S. will continue to capture a significant portion of European defense spending, although it’ll face growing competition from countries such as South Korea and Turkey. In this context, the European Defense Readiness 2030 initiative could represent a historic turning point.

Images | Chad Horwedel | Lockheed Martin | Air Force

Related | The U.S. Has Another Problem: China Prepares to Lead in Chip Manufacturing for Advanced Weapons

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