The recently released report deals a major blow to the U.S. in the space race. It explains why NASA has delayed the program for many years.
Boeing is likely counting the days until the end of 2024, but it still has several months to go. Now, NASA inspectors have added a new report to its list of misfortunes and human errors during the first half of the year. Apparently, the construction of a key piece for the long-awaited return to the Moon doesn't pass quality control.
The news. NASA’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) on Thursday released a report on the progress of version 1B of the Space Launch System (SLS), the rocket the space agency hopes to launch in 2028 with the equipment needed to establish a base on the Moon. A vital part of the spacecraft is a new booster section called the Exploration Upper Stage (EUS), which will increase the SLS’s payload capacity by 40%.
The report casts serious doubt on Boeing’s ability to deliver on time. After a two-year investigation of NASA’s New Orleans assembly facility, known as Michoud, inspectors found that Boeing personnel made numerous mistakes, including poor welds on the oxygen tanks, metal shavings, and Teflon inside the liquid hydrogen tank. These failures delayed the program by as much as seven months.
Low skill levels. The report found low skill levels among production workers. Low retention was another problem, which the study attributed to two factors: wages below industry standards and the facility’s location in New Orleans, which made it difficult to attract “talented” workers.
“According to Safety and Mission Assurance officials at NASA and DCMA officials at Michoud, Boeing’s quality control issues are largely caused by its workforce having insufficient aerospace production experience,” the study stated. “The lack of a trained and qualified workforce increases the risk that Boeing will continue to manufacture parts and components that do not adhere to NASA requirements and industry standards,” it added.
Quality falls short of standards. According to the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), Boeing received 71 “corrective action” requests over the course of two years, a much higher number than usual. Many of the mistakes Boeing made were the same kind of quality control lapses that have plagued its commercial aircraft production: self-certification of substandard work, failure to follow up on work so NASA could verify it, and “unacceptable environmental conditions.”
“We found that Boeing’s quality management system does not meet industry standards in core stage production at Michoud,” the report states. “Given Boeing’s quality management and its related workforce challenges, we are concerned these factors could potentially impact the safety of the SLS and Orion spacecraft, including its crew and cargo.”
Block 1 B’s importance. NASA sees the new exploration upper stage, a more powerful second stage for the SLS rocket that debuted in late 2022, as a key part of its Artemis program to return humans to the Moon. The plan is to use this new upper stage beginning with the second lunar landing, the Artemis IV mission, which is currently scheduled for 2028.
As such, this is a high-risk program. The first three Block 1 SLS systems will carry U.S. crews to the Moon for the first time in half a century and, if all goes well, establish a base on Earth's only natural satellite.
Cost overruns. NASA’s current Block 1B construction estimate is approximately $5 billion. Still, according to the reviewers, this figure will increase to roughly $5.7 billion due to cost overruns and planned program changes.
In addition, NASA projected EUS development costs at $962 million, but has since increased them to $2.8 billion by 2028. Much of this change is due to the space agency diverting funds to cover the cost overruns in the Artemis I development process.
Penalty recommendation. NASA’s OIG was apparently concerned about the quality control it discovered, so it recommended that the space agency impose financial penalties for Boeing’s noncompliance. However, in response, NASA’s deputy associate administrator Catherine Koerner declined.
“NASA interprets this recommendation to be directing NASA to institute penalties outside the bounds of the contract,” she replied. “There are already authorities in the contract, such as award fee provisions, which enable financial ramifications for noncompliance with quality control standards.”
And the winner may be... As Ars Technica details, in a bizarre twist, the cost increase may end up benefiting Boeing itself since it’s “a cost-plus contract, which in turn pays for all of Boeing’s costs, plus a fee. This may help explain why a development program that was originally scheduled to be completed in 2021 is now likely to be completed in 2028 at the earliest,” the media outlet concluded.
Image | NASA, RawPixel
This article was written by Miguel Jorge and originally published in Spanish on Xataka.
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