For a long time, the government’s public stance was clear: Only the president could order a nuclear strike. So far, so “normal.” What wasn’t widely understood was the “key” to access the button—the maximum security measure in case of sabotage. Nor were the contingency plans in place if the president died during a nuclear attack. The potential consequences of these gaps would have been apocalyptic.
Nuclear security during the Cold War. At the height of the Cold War, the security of U.S. nuclear codes was, to put it mildly, alarmingly poor. Despite the critical need to protect these codes to prevent accidental or unauthorized launches, security measures were surprisingly lax.
Fisher’s proposal. In the 1980s, Roger Fisher, a Harvard academic specializing in negotiation and conflict management, proposed an unusual idea to the Pentagon. He suggested implanting the nuclear codes in the chest of a volunteer who would accompany the president. If the president decided to launch a nuclear strike, he would have to kill the volunteer to access the codes, confronting the human cost of such a decision.
Fisher argued this would force the president to fully grasp the weight of causing millions of deaths. The Pentagon rejected the idea, explaining that requiring the president to kill someone could distort judgment and possibly prevent action during a nuclear crisis. The response highlighted a priority for rapid response capability over moral deterrence.
The revelations. A report later shocked many. Bruce Blair, a nuclear expert and former launch officer, revealed that after President John F. Kennedy ordered the use of codes to safeguard atomic weapons in 1962, Strategic Air Command (SAC) prioritized speed over security.
What did this mean? Blair claimed SAC set the launch codes for Minuteman nuclear missiles to “00000000” (eight zeros) to allow for immediate launch on command. This drastically lowered barriers to unauthorized launches. In other words, launching nuclear bombs was as easy as typing a simple password like 123456, which consistently tops the world’s most-used passwords list.
Negotiations and controversy. Blair’s claims embarrassed the Air Force, which denied any recollection of using an eight-zero code to activate or launch Minuteman missiles. Blair stood by his assertions, citing technical manuals that specified “00000000” as the default code under normal conditions. He also accused the Air Force of providing misleading information about its nuclear security protocols.
A layer of security. Coincidentally or not, by 1977, a more robust system was in place. Launch personnel were required to contact a higher authority to obtain the necessary codes, strengthening safeguards and reducing the risk of accidental or unauthorized launches.
Promotional orders and SIOP. Another key moment in nuclear safeguards occurred in the 1950s when the Soviet Union tested its first atomic bomb and, later, a hydrogen bomb in 1955.
As the Soviet arsenal grew and long-range bombers posed new threats, U.S. leaders reconsidered who could authorize nuclear strikes if the president was incapacitated.
In the late 1950s, President Dwight D. Eisenhower issued secret orders called “Furtherance.” These preauthorized military commanders to launch nuclear strikes in two scenarios: If time was too short to consult the president or if the president died in an attack. The orders included the activation of the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), which outlined a massive nuclear counterattack targeting thousands of sites in the Soviet Union, China, and other Communist bloc countries.
Apocalypse. The term “apocalypse” was commonly used to dramatize the scale of SIOP. It envisioned nuclear strikes on more than 4,000 targets within 30 hours, with multiple weapons assigned to key locations.
Estimates suggested over 200 million people would die immediately, with tens of millions more succumbing in the aftermath—all in pursuit of securing a U.S. victory.
Policy review. Eisenhower and his successors recognized the risks of delegating authority but viewed a lack of response mechanisms as a greater danger. In 1968, President Lyndon B. Johnson revised the orders, adopting a more flexible policy. The U.S. would respond with conventional weapons if the initial attack didn’t involve nuclear arms. This shift marked a step toward proportional military responses and away from automatic full-scale nuclear retaliation.
In the nick of time. The history of “nuclear security,” a topic one might assume was exhaustively planned and studied, leaves many questions and reveals potential gaps. Fortunately, these vulnerabilities never led to catastrophe.
These situations underscore the tension between the need for swift crisis response and the implementation of safeguards to prevent misuse of nuclear weapons. They also highlight how, during periods of extreme international tension, security can be compromised in favor of operational efficiency. Perhaps the most surprising takeaway: We survived an era when eight zeros unlocked the nuclear button and when a man might have carried the launch codes embedded in his chest.
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