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The Secret of the Sabotaged Chips: This Is How U.S. Spies Tricked Russia by Accident in the 1980s

  • The operation began almost by accident and became a landmark success for U.S. intelligence.

  • The pivotal figure was an Austrian double agent recruited on the spur of the moment.

How U.S. spies tricked Russia in the 1980s
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javier-pastor

Javier Pastor

Senior Writer

Computer scientist turned tech journalist. I've written about almost everything related to technology, but I specialize in hardware, operating systems and cryptocurrencies. I like writing about tech so much that I do it both for Xataka and Incognitosis, my personal blog. LinkedIn

It sounds like the plot of a spy novel or movie, but it’s a true story. According to former FBI and CIA agents who claim to have been involved, U.S. intelligence orchestrated an extraordinary operation that successfully deceived Russia. The Soviets believed they had acquired access to cutting-edge American microchips, but in reality, they were handed sabotaged technology.

A chance encounter. According to Politico, the operation started with FBI agent Rick Smith meeting an Austrian-born tech entrepreneur in the early 1980s. Initially, the entrepreneur caught the FBI’s attention for visiting the Soviet consulate in San Francisco, but their first interaction yielded little. A year later, a second encounter led Smith to propose a daring plan: Offering the Soviets access to advanced U.S. microelectronics. It was a prize they couldn’t resist.

Spy by surprise. The Austrian entrepreneur, whose identity remains undisclosed, had previously attempted to do legitimate business with the Soviets without success. Smith suggested offering them advanced U.S. chips, something the Russians would find hard to refuse.

Stealing technology has always been in vogue. What Russia sought at the time was no different from what nations have always done—then and now—when vying for strategic advantages. The relentless pursuit of technological secrets has long been a hallmark of global espionage. Following a brief training period, the Austrian entrepreneur transformed into a remarkably effective double agent. FBI agent Smith, astonished by his natural aptitude, remarked, “He knew what he was doing.”

Operation Interling. This was the name given to a major transcontinental operation undertaken by the U.S. over several years. Its singular objective was threefold: to sell sabotaged technology to the Russians and their allies, unmask Soviet intelligence agents and American collaborators, and uncover the specific technologies the Soviets were actively pursuing.

The Russians didn’t fall so fast. Initially, the first contacts were underwhelming. The FBI dispatched the Austrian to Vienna, a neutral hub for espionage at the time. There, he approached the Soviet embassy, offering advancements in U.S. microelectronics and computer technology. However, the Russians were hesitant to take the bait. While they showed some curiosity, they made it clear they were primarily interested in classified information. Rather than striking a deal directly, they redirected the Austrian to their Eastern Bloc allies.

But they fell into a trap. This strategy was standard Russian practice, relying on allies to act as intermediaries. By routing deals through countries like East Germany and Bulgaria, they created a smokescreen to obscure their direct involvement. The Austrian operative dutifully followed this chain, engaging with these Eastern Bloc allies. The blurred transactions made it harder for U.S. intelligence to focus on deals directly linked to Russia.

Chips and sabotaged machines. The operation spanned multiple agencies and companies across various countries, but one thing quickly became clear: The Soviets weren’t just looking to use American chips—they aimed to reverse-engineer them. Among the items that found their way into Soviet hands were sabotaged components, such as “servo recorders,” essential for manufacturing hard drives. These components were cleverly altered, often with subtle defects or limitations, ensuring they couldn’t function as intended while appearing genuine enough to avoid suspicion.

High stakes and growing danger. By 1983, Interling had reached its peak, with the Austrian agent playing a dangerous game of cat and mouse. The operation revealed valuable insights into Soviet interests and their technological deficiencies. However, when a shipment of sabotaged components was intercepted by Bulgarian intelligence, the Soviets demanded the Austrian explain himself in Sofia—a request Smith and the FBI saw as a likely trap. Fearing for the agent’s safety, the FBI terminated the operation, declaring it a success. “We were acutely aware of the danger to him,” the former agents said.

All for fun… and something else. This operation also succeeded in triggering further investigations. Still, there was always the question of why the Austrian had decided to collaborate and put his life at risk. One of the ex-agents involved in the operation was clear: “He did all this for the sheer fun of doing it. And, like most Austrians, he hated the Russians.”

Image | Sander Sammy (Unsplash) Jordhan Madec (Unsplash)

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